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The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property ("Jurisdictional Immunities Convention")' is the first worldwide
agreement to formalize a consistent approach to jurisdictional immunity.
Basically it presents a list of situations in which a person or commercial entity
may sue a foreign government. Under the convention, when a foreign
government engages in commercial transactions,2 for example, it cannot invoke
immunity from certain lawsuits arising out of those transactions. But a foreign
government can invoke immunity when it gravely violates human rights. This is
because the Jurisdictional Immunities Convention lacks an immunity-waiver
provision-similar to the one it contains for commercial transactions-for
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, extrajudicial executions,
and enforced disappearances.
Amnesty International finds this omission so upsetting that apparently it has
blocked the convention by persuading states not to ratify it.4 Nevertheless, "the
BS 1999, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; JD Candidate 2009, The University of
Chicago. Thanks to Professor Tom Ginsburg, Professor Gerhard Hafner, Christopher Keith Hall,
the International Law Commission, Amnesty International, and the CJIL staff and editorial board
for their comments and suggestions.
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 44 ILM
803 (2005) ("Jurisdictional Immunities Convention'").
2 This Comment employs "commercial transactions" as a term of art defined within the
Jurisdictional Immunities Convention. American readers may be more familiar with the term
"commercial activities" used in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 USC
§ 1605(a)(2) (1976). For present purposes, the terms are interchangeable.
3 Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, art 10. See also Section II.B below.
4 Compare Interview with Dr. Gerhard Hafier, Professor of European, International, and
Comparative Law, Vienna University (Oct 31, 2007) ("Hafner interview"), and Christopher Keith
Hall, Senior Legal Advisor, International Justice Project, Amnesty International, UN Convention on
State Immunity: The Need for a Human Rights Protocol, 55 Ind & Comp L Q 411, 426 (2006) (urging
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principle of State immunity has been firmly established as a norm of customary
international law."5 Blocking the convention's ratification thus succeeds only in
blocking the benefits to be achieved from transforming customary international
law into treaty law: formal agreement, collaboration, and progressive
development away from statism and absolute immunity. To surpass this hurdle,
the International Law Commission ("ILC") is considering drafting a separate
protocol concerning the issue of human rights immunity that would enable the
convention to be adopted as written.6
This Comment embraces the separate protocol by advocating a minimalist
approach to interpreting the convention. Section II begins by providing
background on the international law of state immunity for commercial
transactions. It then analyzes the convention's approach to commercial
transactions and argues that the commercial-transaction provisions are best
interpreted as a general agreement on nonabsolute or restrictive immunity rather
than as instructive specifications for ratifying states. Section III supports the new
human rights protocol's pragmatism. It begins by providing background on the
international law of state immunity for human rights violations. Next it shows
that the convention's trend away from statism and absolute immunity supports
cosmopolitan goals inline with the international law of human rights. Finally it
argues that progress toward restrictive immunity beneficial to the human rights
movement should not be delayed by other concerns more profitably pursued
elsewhere. The Comment ultimately implores Amnesty International to support
the Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, because the convention, like the US
Constitution, "though it may not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a
good one. '
"the UK not to ratify the Convention until a [human rights] protocol is adopted... coupled with
a diplomatic effort to urge other states to do the same"), with Interview with Christopher Keith
Hall (June 4, 2008) ("I think Dr. Hafner gives our organization entirely too much credit. It would
be useful to talk to the legal advisers of a number of foreign ministries to see if this opposition is
a significant factor in the reluctance of states to ratify the Convention."). The convention has
been signed by only twenty-eight of the thirty states necessary for entry into force. Although the
signature period expired on January 17, 2007, the convention may yet enter into force if two or
more additional states accede. See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), art 15,
1155 UN Treaty Set 331 (1980).
5 The International Law Commission, the UN group responsible for drafting the convention, fully
supports this claim. Sompong Sucharitkul, Second Report on Jurisdic ional Immunities of States and Their
Propery, 2 YB Ind L Commn 199, 221 (1980), UN Doc A/CN.4/331 and Add.1.
6 Hafner interview (cited in note 4). For the text of an earlier proposal codifying an exception to
jurisdictional immunity in cases involving violations of jus cogens human rights, see Jirgen
Br6hmer, State Immuniy and the Violation of Human RIgbts 214-15 (Martinus Nijhoff 1997).
7 Federalist 85 (Hamilton), in Mortimer J. Adler, ed, 40 Great Books of the Western World 257
(Britannica 2d ed 1996).
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II. JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES CONVENTION
A. STATE PRACTICE REGARDING COMMERCIAL-
TRANSACTION IMMUNITY
Historically states were granted absolute immunity from the judicial
processes of other states.8 Chief Justice Marshall attributed this absolute
immunity to the "perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns" and
the "common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange
of good offices with each other."9 Today these maxims are not forgotten, as
states may confer immunity "to prevent embarrassment to the conduct of
foreign relations" or out of deference to a "state's legitimate right to manage its
affairs."' 10 But unlike in Chief Justice Marshall's era of absolute immunity, today
states increasingly practice restrictive immunity, whereby exceptions are made
regularly for a state's commercial transactions gone bad and occasionally for
human rights violations."
The major exception to immunity has long been for state behaviors that
qualify as commercial transactions. Whereas all states continue to grant
immunity to foreign governments for their public, noncommercial acts in
exercise of sovereign or governmental authority, states increasingly deny
immunity for foreign states' acts that are private and commercial. 2 But while
some states still grant absolute immunity, the many others that create a
commercial-transaction exception differ about how to apply it. Although "the
principle of State immunity has been firmly established as a norm of customary
international law," 13 within this norm, as the following sections describe, the
commercial-transaction exception is practiced in inconsistent ways within and
across various states. As described by Professor Gerhard Hafner, former
member of the ILC and leader of the effort to draft and negotiate the
Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, the legal relationships existing in such a
system are unpredictable and unstable. 4 Unpredictability and instability exist
8 Joseph M. Sweeney, The InternationalLaw of Sovereign Immuniy 20 (US Dept of State 1963).
9 The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
10 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Coiporations 389, 393 (Transnad 2d ed
2002).
11 For summaries of state practices regarding absolute and restrictive immunity, see generally
Gerhard Hafner, Marcelo G. Kohen, and Susan Breau, eds, State Practice Regarding State Immunities
168-704 (Martinus Nijhoff 2006); Ernest K. Bankas, The State Immunity Controvey in International
Law 317-60 (Springer 2005).
12 See Bankas, State Immunio Controversy at 103 (cited in note 11).
13 Sucharitkul, Second Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 221 (cited in note 5).
14 Hafner, Kohen, and Breau, eds, State Practice Regarding State Immuniies at x (cited in note 11).
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within the context of commercial-transaction immunity along at least three
dimensions: the definition of "commercial," the treatment of state agencies, and
the jurisdictional nexus requirement.
1. Definition of "Commercial"
One of the largest puzzles a court faces when deciding to confer immunity
on a foreign state is whether the state's transactions giving rise to the suit are an
exercise of sovereign power or are commercial. Many states look to the "nature"
of an activity to determine if it is commercial. Under the nature test, courts ask
whether the transaction is of the type that a private or ordinary person could
have performed. 5 One court found that an ordinary person can sell a fighter jet,
for example, and therefore that a state's sale of a fighter jet is commercial. 6 But
one could also view the transaction as noncommercial under the nature test
because owning and selling fighter jets seems unrealistic or impractical for an
ordinary person to do. Ultimately the test is "complicated by the diverse social
organizations of different countries embodying differing concepts of what is the
proper sphere of private activity.'
17
States also may determine the commerciality of an activity by examining its
"purpose."' 8 Under the purpose test, courts ask whether the state's transaction
serves a private purpose. If so, the transaction is properly considered
commercial. Whether a transaction serves a public or private purpose, however,
spawns much disagreement, especially among nations with vastly different public
sectors proceeding with vastly different purposes. For example, a small state may
be forced to contract for basic commodities essential to its existence and claim
immunity for that purpose. 9 But even a large state with an international military
presence that contracts with local food vendors to feed its troops may be said to
be acting for a public purpose. The test ultimately becomes unusable because a
state's activity always can be plausibly framed as having a public purpose.2"
The result of trying to distinguish between public and private acts by a
government, according to Justice Frankfurter, is "irreconcilable conflict" and
"inevitable chaos."2 This may overstate matters as they exist today, but
15 See, for example, Saudi Arabia v Nelson, 507 US 349, 360-62 (1993); Algenina v Weltover, 504 US
607, 614 (1992).
16 Virtual Defense and Development Intl, Inc v Moldova, 133 F Supp 2d 1, 4 (DDC 1999).
17 Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations at 360-61 (cited in note 10).
18 See id at 341. See, for example, Kingdom of Roumania v Guarany Trust Co, 250 F 341, 345 (2d Cir
1918).
19 Reid v Repubic ofNauru [1993] 1 VR 251 (Austi).
20 Berir4 Bros Co v The Pesaro, 271 US 562, 574 (1926).
21 Indian Towing Co v United States, 350 US 61, 65 (1955).
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inconsistencies persist nevertheless. "ITmhe plethora of different terms and tests
are [sic] only evidence for the difficulty of finding generally acceptable as well as
applicable criteria. '2 In a world where commercial transactions increasingly
cross state borders and deal with foreign governments,23 the unpredictable
nature of a nonuniform system adds considerable risk to the parties involved.
2. Treatment of State Agencies
Another conundrum a court faces in deciding whether to afford a defendant
immunity is the question whether the defendant is a "state"-a term that eludes
easy definition. When the defendant is a foreign-state government with whom a
private party contracts directly, the private party may understand the risk of
losing a suit arising out of the contract, for the foreign government constitutes a
state for purposes of immunity. As a result of this clear designation, the private
party may be able to deal with the risk, for example, by charging higher prices or
by obtaining insurance available on the public market24 or the private market.
By contrast, a private party dealing with a foreign government's agency or
instrumentality, such as a national bank or railway administration, may be
unaware of the need to combat the risk of immunity. Furthermore, the
calculation of risk in this situation is less predictable and therefore makes
insurance costlier. State practice diverges regarding whether a court will treat a
state agency as sufficiently controlled by the state so as to consider immunity,
25
and indeed this is an unresolved matter of international law.26 Within states as
well, courts may apply vague balancing tests that invite different results.2 7 Novel
22 Stephan Wittich, The Definition of Commercial Acts in Hafner, Kohen, and Breau, eds, State Pracice
Regarding State Immuniies 21, 21 (cited in note 11).
23 Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a PrivatiZed World, 31 Yale J Intl L 383, 383-85 (2006)
(recounting how states and international organizations increasingly are turning to private actors to
perform core military, foreign-aid, and diplomatic functions).
24 See, for example, the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency, available online at
<http://www.miga.org> (visited Dec 5, 2008); the Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
available online at <http://www.opic.gov> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
25 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity 323 (Oxford 2002). For a description of diverse state
practices regarding immunity for state agencies, see id at 336-53.
26 The amount of state direction or control necessary for the state to incur responsibility to aliens is
an unresolved issue of international law. Compare Militay and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v US),
1984 ICJ 392, 436 (requiring a high degree of "effective control" of operations), with Prosecutor v
Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber (ICTY 1999) 131-37 (requiring
only "overall control... regardless of any specific instruction by the controlling state"). See also
Richard Morgan, Professional Military Firms under International Law, 9 Chi J Ind L 213, 232-35
(2008).
27 See, for example, First National Cy Bank v Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 US 611, 629
(1983) (allowing immunity only when either the control is so extensive "that a relationship of
principle and agent is created" or to do otherwise "would work fraud or injustice").
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issues may arise regarding the treatment of agency subsidiaries and agencies
controlled by more than one state. In summary, transactions with state-
controlled agencies are made more expensive by inconsistencies in the definition
of "state" for the purposes of state immunity.
3. Jurisdictional Nexus Requirement
As President of the International Court of Justice Rosalyn Higgins once
stated,
{T]his is really a question of jurisdiction, not of immunity. It is for countries to
formulate the circumstances in which they will be prepared to assert jurisdiction
over events occurring abroad. I see no reason of principle why jurisdiction over
a foreign State should not stand or fall on these principles .... 28
States disagree about the nexus required before a forum state may exercise
jurisdiction over claims brought against a foreign state. 29 The US, for example,
applies extraterritorial jurisdiction when the commercial activity causes a "direct
effect" in its borders.3 ° Other states, including those that practice restrictive
immunity, do not apply the effects test, relying instead on more traditional
jurisdictional nexuses such as the place of incorporation or contracting.
Furthermore, American circuit courts apply the effects test inconsistendy."
Given this inconsistent practice among and within states, additional uncertainty
is added to the already uncertain calculation by private parties of whether they
will be able to hail foreign-state defendants into court.
B. THE CONVENTION'S APPROACH TO
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
In 1977, the UN General Assembly asked the ILC to begin its work on
jurisdictional immunities "with a view to its progressive development and
codification. 3 2 In 2004, when the General Assembly adopted the convention
28 Rosalyn C. Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 Neth Intl L Rev 265,
273 (1982).
29 Fox, The Law of State Immunit at 64 (cited in note 25). See also Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of
Jurisdiction, 27 Mich J Intl L 1003, 1019-21 (2006) (discussing the different jurisdictional
paradigms of common law and civil law states).
30 FSIA, 28 USC § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
31 Compare Voest-A oine Trading USA Corp v Bank of China, 142 F3d 887, 897 (5th Cir 1998) (holding
"that a financial loss incurred in the United States by an American plaintiff... constitutes a direct
effect sufficient to support jurisdiction'), with United World Trade, Inc v Mangyshlakneft, 33 F3d
1232, 1238 (10th Cir 1994) (declining to exercise jurisdiction when the plaintiff "lost profits ... as
a result of the defendants' actions").
32 General Assembly Res No 32/151, UN Doc A/RES/32/151 (1977). See also United Nations
Charter, art 13, $ (1)(a) (granting UN General Assembly the power to "initiate studies and make
Vol. 9 No. 2
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and invited states to become parties, it stressed "the importance of uniformity
and clarity in the law of jurisdictional immunities. '33 Seeing as uniformity and
clarity of restrictive-immunity rules elude today's unstable and unpredictable
approach to state immunity, 34 the key to achieving the General Assembly's twin
goals of uniformity and clarity is "progressive development, '35 or change for the
better.
Thus this section begins by recognizing that uniformity and clarity are the
recognized goals in a progressively developed system of immunity, whereby
states are denied immunity for claims arising out of their commercial
transactions. The following subsections analyze the degree to which the
convention achieves these goals of uniformity and clarity.
1. Strengths
After thirty years of work toward achieving uniformity and clarity, the ILC's
accomplishments, embodied in the Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, are
numerous. To begin with, the convention takes the initial step in providing a
single multilateral agreement or starting point for analysis from which parties can
direct their courts to analyze whether to grant immunity in specific cases. The
convention provides a common source of law, which is necessary to achieve
uniformity.
Furthermore, specific to the issue of state immunity for commercial
transactions, the convention takes the first step in agreeing upon a common
definition of "commercial transaction," emphasizing the nature test over the
purpose test" and listing specific examples to crystallize this definition.
Regarding other issues, such as the definition of "state" and the nexus
requirement, the convention achieves agreement, if not uniformity, so as to
work around a hurdle to codification.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the convention embodies a large-
scale effort whereby states have enjoyed a forum to debate these issues, gain
recognition for the significance of jurisdictional immunity, and attach legitimacy
to the notion that uniformity and clarity are essential to predictability and
stability. The convention mobilizes nations to think about jurisdictional
immunity and, significantly, may push nations to switch from practicing absolute
immunity to practicing restrictive immunity.
recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in the political field
and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification').
33 General Assembly Res No 59/38, UN Doc A/RES/59/38 (2004).
34 See Section II.A.1 above.
35 General Assembly Res No 32/151 (cited in note 32).
36 These tests are discussed in Section H.A.1 above.
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2. Opportunities
Despite these successes, opportunities remain to achieve uniformity and
clarity, specifically in the areas that need it most: the definition of "commercial,"
the treatment of state agencies, and the jurisdictional nexus requirement.
a) Definition of "commercial" The convention provides the following
guidance for determining whether a transaction is commercial: look primarily to
its nature, but also to its purpose, and nevertheless look to treaties or relevant
domestic law.3" This guidance combines various states' vague definitions of state
practice rather than providing a more precise definition. Despite this
imprecision, the convention increases uniformity and consistency insofar as it
encourages wholesale abandonment of absolute immunity rather than accepting
the current mixed regime whereby some states practice restrictive immunity and
others practice absolute immunity. States may see the convention as a
justification for abandoning the doctrine of absolute immunity, as if the
commercial disadvantages were not enough,38 because the convention provides
the legitimacy of multilateral agreement.
Yet a move toward restrictive immunity may decrease predictability. States
that practice absolute immunity are nothing but predictable in the way they
decide whether to grant immunity-they always grant it. States that change from
practicing absolute to restrictive immunity, however, perhaps due to signing the
convention, are left with a clean slate to determine what constitutes a
commercial transaction for purposes of commercial-transaction immunity. Such
countries may follow inconsistent practices not only among themselves in this
regard, as before, but also within themselves in a struggle to apply the
nature/purpose test.
b) Treatment of state agences. The convention affords immunity to state
agencies and instrumentalities "to the extent that they are entitled to perform
and are actually performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of the
State."39 This provision leaves the decision as to whether a state agency may
qualify for immunity to the various states, whose state agencies vary in size and
37 Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, art 2, stating:
In determining whether a contract or transaction is a "commercial transaction"...
reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but its
purpose should also be taken into account if the parties to the contract or transaction
have so agreed, or if, in the practice of the State of the forum, that purpose is relevant
to determining the noncommercial character of the contract or transaction.
38 Commercial disadvantages are what have prompted numerous nations to abandon the practice of
absolute immunity. See, for example, Letter from Jack Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the Secretary
of State, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), in 26 Dept St Bull 984
(1952).
39 Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, art 2(1)(b)(3).
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scope due to differing ideologies and economic and political systems. For
centrally run economies like China's, for example, agencies such as
transportation and housing authorities more clearly comprise part of the state.
For economies like that of the US, which rely more on the private market, such
agencies more closely approximate private corporations, thereby increasing the
chances that the agency's state and the forum state will disagree about whether
the agency qualifies for immunity.40 Rather than resolving this disagreement, the
convention safeguards a patchwork of clashing national laws that may do no
better than absolute immunity at fostering amicable foreign relations and
efficient commerce.
c) Jurisdictional nexus requirement. Meeting the previous two opportunities,
that is, providing a unifying definition of "commercial" and a unifying treatment
of state agencies, would succeed in reforming substantive laws. By contrast, a
unifying jurisdictional nexus requirement would succeed in dictating whose
substantive law would govern. As greater international commerce and
technological advances increase the frequency and scope of conflict over
application of law, the question of how to allocate judicial authority among
states grows increasingly critical. Yet the convention exempts commercial
transactions from immunity only if "the applicable rules of private international
law" confer jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes over the commercial transaction.4'
Thus, for example, the convention permits the US to continue to apply its
effects test to confer personal jurisdiction, and moreover permits it to continue
applying it inconsistently among its circuit courts, while other states that do not
employ the effects test do not become empowered to use the test but rather are
left to their own devices. As with the treatment of state agencies, the convention
codifies clashing national laws rather than encouraging a unified approach.
C. RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY CODIFIED
The convention focuses on eliminating practices that allow governments to
escape suit after injuring private parties. Significantly, it may further the trend
from absolute to restrictive immunity. But as the previous section demonstrates,
the convention cannot reasonably be interpreted as a vehicle for the General
Assembly's stated goals of uniformity and clarity42 with respect to the
individually codified rules of commercial-transaction immunity. Rather, as this
section argues, one should interpret uniformity and clarity to describe the
convention's general and unmistakable step away from the general theory of
40 Fox, The Law of State Immuniy at 337 (cited in note 25).
41 Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, art 10(1).
42 General Assembly Res No 59/38 (cited in note 33).
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absolute immunity today, with a view to achieving uniformity and clarity of
specific restrictive-immunity rules in the future.
1. The Convention's Preamble
The ILC recognizes the need for progressive development to achieve the
goals of the convention. The convention's preamble states that, if adopted, the
convention "would enhance the rule of law and legal certainty, particularly in
dealings of States with natural or juridical persons, and would contribute to the
codification and development of international law and the harmonization of
practice in this area." 43 The preamble speaks not only of the "development of
international law," but also of achieving goals through a verb that implies change
or departure from the past ("enhance"). The preamble thus presages
international law's progressive development. More specifically, as discussed
below, the preamble and indeed the rest of the convention call for
harmonization and enhancement of legal certainty with respect only to a
wholesale abandonment of absolute immunity, not to the individual rules that
enforce restrictive immunity.
The ultimate objectives of the convention, as stated in its preamble, do not
reference the specific terms "uniformity" or "clarity," the importance of which
the General Assembly emphasizes in calling on states to ratify the convention.
44
Instead, the preamble employs the terms "harmonization" and "legal certainty."
Harmonization, depending on the dictionary one uses, implies agreement or
coordination, not necessarily strict uniformity. 4' Furthermore, mere agreement
or coordination away from absolute immunity is a more plausible goal than
uniformity of individual rules, given varying state practices with respect to rules
regarding the definition of "commercial," the definition of "state," and the
jurisdictional nexus requirement.46 Thus, if harmonization does not imply
uniformity, then it must indicate an agreement to depart from absolute
immunity. If it does imply uniformity, uniformity must be interpreted to refer
only to a uniform departure from absolute immunity, because as previous
sections have demonstrated, the convention indisputably does not codify a
uniform set of rules.
43 Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, preamble.
44 General Assembly Res No 59/38 (cited in note 33).
45 Compare Black's Law Dictionagy 595 (West 8th ed 2005) (defining harmony as "agreement or
accord; conformity"), with Peter E. Nygh and Peter Butt, eds, Australian Legal Dictionary 543
(Butterworths 1997) (defining harmonization as "cooperation between governments to make laws
more uniform and coherent").
46 See Section IL.A above.
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"Legal certainty," as also stated in the preamble, is directly inline with the
General Assembly's twin goals of uniformity and clarity. Uniformity of legal
rules may drive legal certainty, but again the codification of a patchwork of rules
creates more legal uncertainty than before. To illustrate, a state that practices
absolute immunity is certain to immunize states within its courts. If the same
state joins the convention, the only certainty is that the state has now embraced
restrictive immunity. Sometimes the state will allow suits against foreign
governments but when it will allow such suits remains uncertain. More plausibly,
legal certainty can refer only to the adoption of restrictive immunity because the
convention affords a private plaintiff no certainty as to whether a state practicing
restrictive immunity will or will not grant immunity in the individual case. When
a state joins the convention, one can be certain only that the state will no longer
practice absolute immunity.
In sum, the goals of harmonization and certainty, as written in the preamble,
and of uniformity and clarity, as stated by the General Assembly, seem to apply
not to the rules codified specifically in the convention. Rather, they must apply
to the adoption of restrictive immunity in general.
2. The Convention's Approach to Commercial Transactions
One can interpret the convention to take either a formal or a functional
approach. With either interpretation, uniformity and clarity are achieved with
respect only to the step toward restrictive immunity, not to the form or the
function of how that step is to be taken.
a) Formal inteapretalion. One approach to interpreting the convention,
which indicates only an agreement to abandon absolute immunity, is formal.
Under a formal interpretation, the convention provides a set of precise rules that
everyone can agree upon, such as a list of all transaction types that qualify as
commercial. A formal approach requires unprecedented foresight, however, to
codify the novel situations that courts will face. Realizing as much, formal
approaches typically provide escape hatches based on old standards suffering
from the very inconsistent application formalization intends to prevent. For
example, the convention enumerates the following examples of commercial
transactions: "any commercial contract or transaction for the sale of goods or
supply of services" and "any contract for a loan or other transaction of a
financial nature, including any obligation of guarantee or of indemnity in respect
of any such loan or transaction. 47 This enumeration is useful for crystallizing
what is meant by commercial versus sovereign transactions, but parties are left
interpreting this language in light only of the nature/purpose test to determine if
unenumerated transactions are commercial versus sovereign, because in the law
47 Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, art 2.
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of state immunity "there are no clear-cut criteria ready-made in all instances. 4 8
Therefore, to eliminate the inconsistent results produced by the nature/purpose
test,49 the convention's formal rules are not formal enough.
Nor are they comprehensive enough to eliminate other inconsistent state
practices. With respect to the definition of "state" and the jurisdictional nexus
requirement, the convention provides no rules of its own. The convention
enumerates no rules, for example, that qualify an agency for immunity based on
the percentage of a state's stock ownership or the degree of separation from a
state via subsidiary corporations.5 0 Nor does the convention attempt to make
uniform rules of private international law or refer to the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, whose mandate is "to work for the progressive
unification of the rules of private international law.
' 's
Thus, under a formal interpretive approach, the convention lacks the
comprehensiveness necessary to achieve uniformity and clarity with respect to
formal rules that enforce restrictive immunity. Rather, the convention formalizes
only the uniform abandonment of absolute immunity.
b) Funclional interoretation. The functional interpretive approach, like the
alternative formal approach, also indicates only an agreement to abandon
absolute immunity. Under a functional interpretation, the convention focuses on
and provides the objectives rather than the conditions of state immunity.
Whereas a formal approach asks when or under what conditions ought courts
grant immunity, a functional approach asks why should courts grant it, especially
when a case does not fall into one of the enumerated conditions. A functional
approach benefits from simplicity and concentrates agreement on a much
smaller number of issues. To hypothetically achieve perfect uniformity, it might
also require a supranational court to create precedent for all states to follow until
the next disagreement over a novel issue. Such a supranational court is outside
the scope of the convention, so reaching a certain level of uniformity is possible
only if all parties themselves were to agree on the function of states or of state
immunity.
Two other conventions are paradigmatic of how the Jurisdictional
Immunities Convention could possibly achieve uniform restrictive-immunity
rules, not merely an abandonment of absolute immunity, by formalizing an
48 Wittich, The Definition of CommercialActs at 47 (cited in note 22).
49 See Sections II.A.1 and II.B.2.a above.
50 See, for example, Gabe Shawn Varges, Defining a Sovereign for Immuniy Purposes, 26 Harv Intl L J
103, 152-54 (1985) (proposing a formal approach to the definition of "state" for sovereign-
immunity purposes).
51 Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, art 1, 15 UST 2228 (1964).
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agreement on function. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 2 and
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, 3 both of which have been widely adopted, 4 confer various degrees of
immunity on diplomats, consuls, and their premises from the local laws of the
jurisdictions in which they operate. The two Vienna Conventions begin by
detailing an internationally agreed list of functions performed by diplomats and
consuls and proceed to confer immunity when necessary to avoid interference
with the functions of the diplomatic and consular missions. Diplomats and
consuls have well-defined functions on which everyone can agree, such as the
promotion of amicable relations between states and the protection of foreign
nationals.55 The functional approach toward diplomats and consuls enjoys
almost universal acceptance thanks to common understandings of diplomatic
and consular functions.
Common understandings of a state government's function, however, do not
exist. Thus they are nowhere to be found in the Jurisdictional Immunities
Convention, even though its purpose is to allocate jurisdictional immunities to
state governments, just as the Vienna Conventions' purposes are to allocate
jurisdictional immunities to diplomats and consuls. That the Jurisdictional
Immunities Convention omits a definition of "state" is unsurprising given the
controversy over what constitutes a state for purposes of immunity. 6 Moreover,
despite the Washington consensus in favor of global market liberalism, the
proper functions of a state are widely disputed among socialists, liberals,
conservatives, and libertarians. These differences highlight the nonexistence of
customary international law regarding the proper functions of a state and there is
no reason to think that any convention will resolve these differences.
Given a global society of differently constructed states, the Jurisdictional
Immunities Convention alternatively might focus on the function of state
immunity instead of on the function of a state, for at least two reasons. First, the
precise rules enumerated in the Jurisdictional Immunities Convention are few
and therefore require courts to administer a different test in the remaining
classes of cases. For example, the convention does not enumerate
noncontractual activities that may be seen as commercial. Even if the
enumerated rules were expanded, courts still would require a different test for
52 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 23 UST 3227 (1972).
53 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, 21 UST 77 (1969).
54 Over 180 states are parties to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and about 170
states are parties to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
55 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art 3; Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, art 5.
56 See also the discussion of state agencies in Sections II.A.2 and II.B.2.b above.
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novel cases unforeseen at the time of enumeration. Hence a clear statement
within the convention of the purpose of state immunity would provide guidance
in these unenumerated or novel cases. Second, a test based on the function of
state immunity may be more predictable than the alternative nature/purpose test
required by the convention. A functional test would encourage states to think
about why to grant or deny immunity, not how to grant or deny it. Achieving
eventual harmony or uniformity of state practice requires states to align laws or
legal reasoning, which a functional test would measure. By contrast, the
nature/purpose test seeks to align definitional understandings of "sovereignty"
and "commerciality," which courts may manipulate variously to achieve state
interests without declaring the actual legal reasons for their conclusions. But it is
better to increase transparency in courts' calculations so as to foster empirical
data gathering which could lead to future enumeration of additional precise
rules. A functional approach would achieve this goal by encouraging judges to
state the real reasons for their opinions rather than molding an elastic formal test
to reasons that remain unspoken.
Although this type of functional approach would be useful, inevitably it
would be defined by an open-ended balancing test providing little uniformity
and clarity. The historical function of state immunity is to respect the
sovereignty of states.5 7 The Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, however, is
unique in that it invites states to use their sovereign powers to produce a joint
solution. After the convention enters into force, respecting a sovereign may be
reduced to respecting the convention. If everyone is in agreement, including the
foreign-state defendant, then no longer should there be a concern with
offending the foreign state's sovereignty. To the degree the convention fosters
agreement among competing state interests, therefore, a test based on the
function of state immunity would focus on forum states' interests in granting or
denying immunity. A state may have an interest in exercising jurisdiction over a
foreign state to achieve fairness for plaintiffs and to promote the security and
predictability of the law merchant. Conversely, a state may have a reciprocity
interest in avoiding being a putative defendant in foreign courts due to
retaliation for its exercise of jurisdiction. A functional approach to conferring
immunity, then, would invite states to balance their competing interests in
exercising jurisdiction and in reciprocity, taking into account, for example,
whether the forum state has waived its own immunity from suit, whether
enforcing a judgment in the case (or as precedent in cases that may follow)
would bankrupt a state so as to prevent it from providing a base-level of security
57 See, for example, Br6hmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights at 9-11 (cited in note 6)
(classifying the historical reasons for state immunity as resting on the principles of sovereign
dignity, equality, and independence).
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to its citizens, and any views expressed by the executive branch, which is
uniquely situated to assess the reciprocity interest as the "sole organ" of foreign
relations.58 These balancing factors are provided merely as examples of the types
of concerns states might consider. In any event, interest analysis is notorious for
its open-ended, unpredictable results,59 and states often differ in individual cases
about which balancing factors are most dispositive. Hence the functional
approach cannot provide uniformity and clarity of restrictive-immunity rules.
The only clear function the convention provides is a general move toward
restrictive immunity.
III. ADDITIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTOCOL
This section begins by providing background on the international law of
state immunity for human rights violations and Amnesty International's laudable
stance in this area. It then shows why the convention's general trend toward
restrictive immunity supports cosmopolitan goals inline with international
human rights law. Finally it argues that progress toward restrictive immunity
beneficial to the human rights movement should not be delayed by other
concerns more profitably pursued elsewhere.
A. THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
It has long been established that states have an international legal
responsibility not to injure aliens within their borders or else must be held
responsible for such injuries.6 ° Since the Nazi trials at Nuremburg, international
law has recognized the duty of a state to respect the human rights of its own
nationals. 6' Amnesty International estimates that about 125 nations, including
the US and the UK, provide judicial access to foreign individuals and refuse to
58 United States v Curiss-Wight, 299 US 304, 319 (1936). See Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign"
out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Acivity Exception, 17
Yale J Intl L 489, 520-21, 532-35 (1992) (suggesting an interest-balancing approach in the context
of US law).
59 See, for example, Phillips v General Motors Cotp, 995 P2d 1002, 1008-09 (Mont 2000); Wood Bros
Homes, Inc v WalkerAdjustment Bureau, 601 P2d 1369, 1372-73 (Colo 1979); Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971).
60 See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, UN Doc No A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001) ("Draft Articles on State
Responsibility").
61 See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 993 UN Treaty Set 3
(1976); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UN Treaty Set 171 (1966).
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grant state immunity when a foreign government has gravely violated an
individual's human rights.62
This estimate overstates matters,63 for granting immunity in tort proceedings
is the "prevailing practice and opinion on state immunity." 64 Furthermore, the
issue of state immunity for claims involving human rights remains highly
contested.65 Much of the controversy may stem from the fact that judicial access
is often provided to foreign plaintiffs under the principle of universal
jurisdiction, which requires no nexus with the forum state in order to exercise
jurisdiction. Compared with commercial matters, which require some sort of
jurisdictional nexus, respect for the defendant state's sovereignty becomes more
of an issue when the forum state has no connection with the suit. Even when
the forum state has a connection with the plaintiff, reasonable justices disagree
on what connection suffices to exercise jurisdiction.66 The result is a patchwork
of different rules that often results in letting human rights violations go
unpunished.
B. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S VIEW
Amnesty International is a nongovernmental civil-society organization
dedicated to campaigning for human rights. One of its missions is to prevent
state immunity for grave human rights violations. Therefore, the group
campaigns for universal jurisdiction over these violations.6" Universal jurisdiction
would empower courts everywhere to hear cases involving grave human rights
violations no matter who was victimized or where the crimes were committed.
62 See Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: The Duy of States to Enact and Implement Universal
Jurisdiction, 3 AI Index: IOR 53/014/2001 (Sept 2001).
63 See, for example, Sosa vAlvareq-Machain, 542 US 692, 715 (2004) (recognizing only a "narrow set
of violations" under which the US may exercise universal jurisdiction in civil matters); Fox, The
Law of State Immuniy at 537 (cited in note 25) (discussing how the US and UK generally do not
exercise universal criminal jurisdiction in criminal matters, with terrorism being the sole exception
in the US). See also United States v Usama Bin Laden, 92 F Supp 2d 189, 222 (SDNY 2000)
(suggesting that universal jurisdiction applies over terrorist bombings); United States v Yunis, 924
F2d 1086, 1092 (DC Cir 1991) (suggesting that universal jurisdiction applies over air piracy).
64 Br6hmer, State Immunity and the Violation of Human Rights at 144 (cited in note 6).
65 Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations at 7-8 n 44 (cited in note 10) (citing
myriad contrasting cases and articles).
66 Compare Justice White's concurrence in Saudi Arabia v Nelson, 507 US 349, 364-76 (1993), with
Justice Kennedy's dissent, id at 370-77.
67 Amnesty International, Universal Jurisditon, available online at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/
international-justice/issues/universal-jurisdiction> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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Universal jurisdiction over grave human rights violations also would further
Amnesty International's business-and-human-rights campaign," which seeks
stronger legal frameworks to hold business enterprises accountable for violations
of the human rights standards encoded in the UN Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights.69 While the UN Norms require respect for and
promotion of a broad number of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights, they also call on business enterprises to refrain from engaging in or
benefiting from the types of grave human rights violations that are the subject of
Amnesty International's universal jurisdiction campaign. If, for example, the
prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq could sue the US for human rights
violations perpetrated by private-contractor employees working there as
interrogators and translators, the employees might have checked their behavior
and indeed the US might have done a better job monitoring such behavior.
Universal jurisdiction would provide a way for individuals to bring local suits
regarding human rights violations not only against individuals or business
enterprises-whose inadequate finances may leave them generally judgment-
proof or locally attachment-proof-but also against their government-
employers. This rationale for universal jurisdiction gains force given that states
increasingly outsource their foreign-affairs functions to private parties,70 and that
the conduct of the private parties legally may be attributed to the state if directed
and controlled by the state.
71
For the foregoing reasons, and recognizing that the current state of
customary international law is inadequate for its purposes, 2  Amnesty
International understandably seized an opportunity in the Jurisdictional
Immunities Convention to foster agreement on universal jurisdiction by pressing
for the addition of an immunity-waiver provision whereby states may be held
accountable for grave human rights abuses. Given that universal jurisdiction is a
highly controversial issue, agreement on the convention is blocked. As a result,
progress toward restrictive immunity is halted.
68 Amnesty International, Business and Human Rights, available online at <http://www.amnesty.org/
en/business-and-human-rights> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
69 United Nations, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
70 See Dickinson, 31 Yale J Intl L at 383-85 (cited in note 23).
71 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, arts 5, 8.
72 See Section III.A above.
Winter 2009
Donoho
Chicago Journal of International Law
C. THE BENEFITS OF RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY
There are several schools of academic thought regarding international law
and global governance, including (but hardly limited to) statism and
cosmopolitanism. 7 3 For those who subscribe to statism, or to "realism" as it is
also known in the academic literature, individual states are the primary players
on an international scene where global relations are the natural outcome of
differences in state power.7 4 As one author explains, statism is "the principle that
man's life belongs to the state. ' 7 1 Critics of the Jurisdictional Immunities
Convention may argue that statism associates with the current varied practice of
commercial-transaction immunity, whereby states individually determine their
own rules based on calculations of realpolitik for when to grant immunity.
Although states increasingly trend away from absolute immunity and toward
adjudicating individual claims against foreign states, the trend is subject to
national, not international, laws-notwithstanding the pending Jurisdictional
Immunities Convention-and as such is primarily statist in focus, or so the
argument goes. But, more fundamentally, statism closely associates with the
historical practice of absolute immunity, whereby state sovereigns are given
absolute deference. By trending away from absolute immunity, the Jurisdictional
Immunities Convention reduces statism and fosters cosmopolitanism.
For cosmopolitans, the primary focus shifts from the state to the individual.
Under cosmopolitanism, "all human beings are fundamentally members of one
world order, no matter in what nation they dwell."76 Though cosmopolitans
welcome a humanitarian focus on individual rights, they do not call for the
seemingly impracticable removal of nation-states as do other, more radical
theories of global governance. 7 Instead they "seek to entrench and develop
democratic institutions at regional and global levels as a necessary complement
73 For a fuller typography, see generally, for example, Oona A. Hathaway and Harold Hongju Koh,
Foundations of International Law and Politics 26-204 (Thomas West 2005); Alison Van Rooy, The
GlobalLegitmagy Game: Civil Soai, Globalization, and Protest 130-33 (Palgrave Macmillan 2004).
74 See, for example, Henry Kissinger, Diplomagy 17-28 (Simon & Schuster 1994).
75 Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal 193 (New American 1966).
76 Martha Nussbaum, Culivating Humani in Legal Education, 70 U Chi L Rev 265, 266 (2003). See
also David Held, What Hopefor the Future? Learning the Lessons of the Past, 9 Ind J Global Legal Stud
381, 398 ("National or ethnic or gendered boundaries should not determine the limits of rights or
responsibilities for the satisfaction of basic human needs.').
77 See, for example, Van Rooy, The Global Legiimagy Game at 132-33 (cited in note 73) (describing
the theories of world polity and radical communitarianism); Luke Martell, Capitalism, Globalisaion,
and Democray: Does Social Democrag Have a Role?, available online at
<http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/104martell.htm> (visited Dec 5, 2008) ("[Rladical
communitarians would rather see global governance without global government or nation-
states.").
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to those at the level of the nation-state."78 Cosmopolitanism, therefore, would
call for a regime whereby each state would be just as accountable as any other
state-indeed, just as accountable as any individual-in regard to its dealings
with individuals and commercial entities. In other words, cosmopolitanism
would have states be subject to restrictive immunity rather than absolute
immunity, given a choice between the two. If everyone were following one legal
regime regarding restrictive versus absolute immunity with "a certain generally
acceptable uniformity," then private persons and states would benefit alike. 9
To the degree the Jurisdictional Immunities Convention strives to
accomplish these cosmopolitan goals simply by moving away from absolute
immunity, as this Comment argues is the best way of interpreting the
convention, it is strange that civil-society organizations would oppose its
passage. The London School of Economics' definition of "civil society" is
illustrative:
Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared
interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from
those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries
between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and
negotiated.80
Civil-society organizations such as Amnesty International aim to foster
cosmopolitan goals including but not limited to those that would be fostered by
a uniform move away from absolute immunity. Accordingly, if not for other
priorities, one might expect Amnesty International to support a Jurisdictional
Immunities Convention that succeeds in achieving such uniformity.
D. THE BENEFITS OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
The convention is best interpreted as a general move toward restrictive
immunity or as a way to begin legitimating the notion that states may hold other
states accountable in court." Even if one alternatively interprets the convention
as a move specifically toward a commercial-transaction exception to immunity,
cosmopolitan goals are served and human rights groups should applaud insofar
78 David Held, Democracy and Globalization, MPIfG Working Paper 97/5 (May 1997), available online
at <http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp97-5/wp97-5.html> (visited Dec 5,
2008).
79 Hafner, Kohen, and Breau, eds, State Practice Regarding State Immunities at xii (cited in note 11).
s0 London School of Economics, What Is Civil Sodety?, available online at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/
collections/CCS/what is-civil society.htm> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
81 See Section II.C above.
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as individuals thereby come to be treated on an equal footing in their dealings
with foreign governments.
Of course, governments of developing states may respond plausibly that
when they take foreign property to redistribute to the poor, they further the
right to the development of their peoples and therefore should retain the ability
to invoke commercial-transaction immunity. However, from an economic
perspective, it is unclear that such redistributions result in aid to the intended
recipients or, if they do, that they confer long-term economic benefits. The
economic development of a state may be related more closely to the state's rule
of law than to foreign aid resulting in governmental corruption or poor
economic incentives. 2 Developing states also may call attention to the fact that
rich states harm their poor farmers by erecting protectionist policies,83 and may
argue that they play Robin Hood only in retaliation. But the World Trade
Organization is a more direct remedy for protectionist policies, and for the
resulting source of the human right to development, than the continuance of
commercial-transaction immunity.
The human right to development is captured in the UN Declaration on the
Right to Development:
The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and
enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human
rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. The human right to
development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-
determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both
International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right
to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources. 84
Amnesty International believes that "everybody has equal rights."" To the
degree that individuals are left without judicial recourse when the governments
82 See Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the Jungle, Economist 83-85 (Mar 13, 2008). See also
Gary S. Becker, Is There a Case for Foreign Aid?, and Richard A. Posner, Should the United States
Provide Foreign Aid?, The Becker-Posner Blog (Sept 21, 2007), available online at
<http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2007/01/> (visited Dec 5, 2008) (debating the
duty of rich nations to give aid to developing nations).
83 See The End of Cheap Food, Economist 11 (Dec 8, 2007) (discussing the impact of rich-nation
protectionist policies on developing nations). On the other hand, the EU, the US, and the World
Bank economically incentivize developing countries to improve human rights standards. See
Economics and the Ruk of Law at 84 (cited in note 82). See also Stephen Marks, The Human Right to
Development Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17 Hare Hum Rts J 137, 167 (2004) (discussing the US's
aid conditioned on human rights successes in conjunction with the right to development).
84 Declaration on the Right to Development, UN GAOR, 41st Session, Supp No 53, at 183, UN
Doc A/RES/41/128 (1986).
85 Amnesty International, Human Rights Defenders, available online at <http://www.amnesty.org/
en/human-rights-defenders> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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with which they deal injure them economically, preventing state immunity for
commercial-transaction lawsuits should resonate with the human rights
movement. Human rights activists should be concerned that governments can
injure peoples economically and indiscriminately.
Despite all this, Amnesty International views human rights hierarchically and
focuses on extreme violations of civil and political rights more than mere
economic rights.86 Opposition to the convention, therefore, may be exercised as
leverage to include a human rights provision. However, if one takes a minimalist
approach to interpreting the convention, the convention itself may be seen as
leverage for implementing a separate human rights protocol.
E. SEPARATE HUMAN RIGHTS PROTOCOL
As Section II demonstrates, the Jurisdictional Immunities Convention is best
understood as a method for getting states to move away from absolute immunity
and toward restrictive immunity. That is, it is a way for the courts of forum
states to begin holding foreign states accountable for their actions. This feat is
significant. At least eleven of the twenty-eight signatory states practiced absolute
immunity at the time of the convention's signing period, including China, India,
Iran, and Japan.87 Entering the convention into force would codify a significant
move toward restrictive immunity.88
Amnesty International blocks this significant move because the convention
does not explicitly implore courts to find foreign states accountable for human
rights violations. But the convention is only two votes away from making a
significant step toward restrictive immunity in general, which, as this section has
argued, human rights groups should applaud.89 Furthermore, as evidenced by the
thirty years it took to get to this point, reworking the entire convention to
include human rights provisions-not to mention taking advantage of the
opportunities to provide more uniform and clear rules-would be a step
backward. The situation is comparable to the adoption of the US Constitution,
when Alexander Hamilton convinced the remaining few states to adopt the
86 Id.
87 The current signatory status is available online at <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&id=283&chapter=3&lang=en> (visited Dec 5, 2008). For a classification of
state practices around the time of the convention, see generally Bankas, The State ImmuniDy
Controversy in International Law 317-60 (cited in note 11).
88 See also Hazel Fox, In Defence of State Immunity: Why the UN Convention on State ImmuniFy Is Important,
55 Ind & Comp L Q 399, 399 (2006) (noting that the convention "provides a source of certainty
and detailed international rules for" the national courts of "States... which until recendy adhered
to an absolute doctrine of State immunity").
89 See Sections III.C and III.D above.
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Constitution despite the absence of a bill of rights. Borrowing from Hamilton's
advice, "it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous
amendments"90 to the Jurisdictional Immunities Convention.
The convention achieves uniformity and clarity in the abstract sense of
restrictive immunity. This is a good thing for human rights activists because it
promotes the general idea that other states cannot claim absolute immunity for
their actions. To these conclusions, the following sections identify and address
possible criticisms.
1. The Perfectionist's Critique
One possible criticism to advocacy of a human rights protocol separate from
the convention may be labeled perfectionist. First, perfectionists would support
fostering agreement on perfect uniformity and clarity of rules. This
perfectionism would require broad measures, for "[t]he vexing problem of
distinguishing commercial activities from immune transactions will exist so long
as [a state] wishes to permit its courts to exercise jurisdiction over some, but not
all, activities of foreign states."'" Disagreement about commercial versus
sovereign classifications surely will continue in a commercially changing world
that sees an increasing amount of transactions between state governments and
private parties. 92 Such disagreement is illustrated by cases in which justices
applying the same statute disagree about an activity's commerciality.93 Second,
perfectionists would include provisions eliminating immunity for human rights
violations.
Perfectionists, therefore, would build on the trend away from absolute
immunity and eliminate disagreement by abandoning state immunity altogether.9
However, this could create incalculable liability risks that could bankrupt a state
and leave it without the ability to guarantee the security of its citizens. 9 It also
could lead to states misusing courts for political goals despite the existence of
other safety hatches, such as the act-of-state doctrine.96 Generally it could foster
unpredictably undesirable results due to the sweeping nature of the proposed
90 Federalist 85 (Hamilton) at 257 (cited in note 7).
91 Donoghue, 17 YaleJ Ind L at 522 (cited in note 58).
92 See Dickinson, 31 Yale J Ind L at 383-85 (cited in note 23).
93 See, for example, SaudiArabia v Nelson, 507 US at 364-79.
94 See, for example, Michael Singer, Abandoning Restrictive Sovereign Immuni7: An Analysis in Terms of
Jurisdiction to Presoibe, 26 Harv Ind L J 1, 59 (1985) (proposing the abandonment of state immunity
in favor of the act-of-state doctrine); Richard Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International
Legal Order 139-69 (Syracuse 1964) (proposing the same).
95 Brohmer, State Immuniy and the Violation of Human Rights at 13 (cited in note 6).
96 See generally, for example, Banco Naional de Cuba v Sabbaino, Receiver, 376 US 398 (1964).
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reform. Hence the convention focuses on minimal steps, and in doing so aims to
secure a solution that realistically could foster agreement.
Minimalists "believe in rulings that are at once narrow and theoretically
unambitious. 9 7 They prefer minimal steps toward ultimate goals. Movements
toward restrictive immunity achieve the minimal goal of abandoning absolute
immunity. As described in the area of commercial-transaction immunity, the
convention takes only minimal steps toward the goals of uniformity and clarity
of rules. Much work remains toward unifying and clarifying the rules of
commercial-transaction immunity.
The minimalist nature of interpreting the convention also is inline with
embracing a separate protocol to meet humanitarian concerns. Whether
humanitarians would abandon immunity entirely or only for grave human tights
violations, minimalism more closely averts the risks described above, and a
separate protocol can meet humanitarian concerns.
2. The Statist's Critique
Statists believe that states always act out of self-interest to increase power
relative to other states. Under this theory, a state has incentives to adhere to a
uniform law only if it finds costly either its own law or the coexistence of
different rules.98 Therefore, only states that stand to benefit from the convention
will join it, whereas states that foresee no benefit will refrain. Statists may
support a less than perfect convention or they may balk at the convention
altogether, for states will do what is in their best interests anyway. In other
words, statists may believe Amnesty International's opposition to the
convention does not matter. Two objections respond to this critique. First, that
states have come willingly to the negotiating table in the first place indicates that
those states believe a possible benefit exists. Second, a clear, uniform policy
toward restrictive immunity may benefit everyone, self-interested states included,
by increasing accountability and thereby reducing risk. The convention seeks to
solve a collective-action problem wherein benefits can be achieved only through
multilateral efforts.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment supported the ratification of the Jurisdictional Immunities
Convention and the creation of a separate protocol to address jurisdictional
immunity for human rights violations. As reasons to support the separate human
97 Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich L Rev 353, 353 (2006).
98 Souichirou Kozuka, The Economic Implications of Uniformiy in Law, in Jiirgen Basedow and Toshiyuki
Kono, eds, An Economic Analysis of Private International Law 73, 74-82 (Mohr Siebeck 2006).
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rights protocol, this Comment cited a minimalist interpretation of the
Jurisdictional Immunities Convention, the benefits derivable from this
interpretation, and the pragmatism of taking minimal steps toward restrictive
immurnty.
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